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Introduction
In the context of international finance, "contagion" has come to be referred to as the simultaneous occurrence of currency crises in two or more economies. It may be more formally defined as a situation where a currency crisis in one economy leads to a jump to a "bad" equilibrium in a neighbouring economy (Masson, 1998) 1 . By "currency crisis" we mean an actual break of an exchange rate peg and concomitant currency depreciation, or speculative pressure that may not necessarily lead to an exchange rate depreciation, but does lead to a depletion of foreign exchange reserves or an interest rate hike, with consequent adverse effects on growth.
While contagion could take on a global dimension 2 , there is a growing body of literature confirming its regional dimension. For instance, in a recent study using a sample of 20 countries covering the periods of the 1982 Mexican debt crisis, the 1994-95 Tequila crisis and the 1997-98 East Asian crisis, De Gregario and Valdes (1999) found contagion to be directly dependent on geographical horizon. Using a panel of annual data for 19 developing economies for the period 1977-93, Krueger et al. (1998) concluded that a currency crisis in a regional economy raises the probability of a speculative attack on the domestic currency by about 8.5 percent points 3 .
In the case of East Asia, while the initial stage of the crisis (July to August 1997) occurred as the devaluation of the Thai baht spread to the weaker Southeast Asian economies of Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia, the second stage of the crisis (October to December 1997) impacted the higher income economies, viz. Taiwan, South Korea and the two city states of Hong Kong and Singapore. Notwithstanding some concerns about longer term growth sustainability due to low total factor productivity growth, especially in Singapore (Krugman, 1994 and Young, 1995) , it was generally acknowledged that these two city states had among the strongest macroeconomic fundamentals (Table 1) and most robust financial systems in region, and emerging economies as a whole. Yet they did suffer from the regional crisis.
The Singapore dollar depreciated by about 15 percent relative to the US dollar between July 1997 to March 1999, reversing a persistently appreciating trend over the period prior to the crisis (Chart 1). While Hong Kong's exchange rate remained constant relative to the US dollar, being pegged via a currency board arrangement, this was only managed by a sharp hike in interest rates to counter periods of intense speculative attacks (Chart 2). The inevitable result was a deep recession, with Hong Kong's overall GDP declining by 5 percent in 1998 compared to an average annual growth of about 5 percent during the first half of the 1990s. In Singapore's case, while timely albeit draconian government policies helped cushion the negative shock of the regional crisis (Ngiam, 2000) , growth did nevertheless stagnate in 1998 (0.4 percent), a sharp contrast to the annual average growth of 9 percent in the first half of the 1990s (Table 1) .
A distinction needs to be made between transmission channels that are related to investor sentiment or psychology (termed "pure contagion") and linkages between economies that are measurable/observable ex-ante (referred to as "spillovers" or "fundamentals-based contagion") 4 . Recognising that both Hong Kong and Singapore are small and open economies and are important regional re-export centers with strong regional trade (and investment) links 5 , our focus in this paper is on trade spillovers, i.e. fundamental-based contagion through trade linkages. Indeed, both economies suffered sharp declines in export revenues (in US dollar terms) in 1998 (Table 2 ). The emphasis on the trade channel is also consistent with Glick and Rose (1999) who have noted that: trade is an important channel for contagion, above and beyond macroeconomic influences. Countries who trade and compete with the target of speculative attacks are themselves likely to be attacked…This linkage is intuitive, statistically robust, and important in understanding the regional nature of speculative attacks" (pp.604-5) 6 .
Trade spillovers in turn could either be due to "complementarity" or "competition" in export product structures between regional economies. With regard to the former 4 A third category, "common external shocks" or "monsoonal effects", refers to all those factors that impact all regional economies (Masson, 1998) . A number of external shocks have been suggested in the case of the East Asian crisis (Whitt, 1999) .
("direct channel"), there may exist extensive intraregional trade and investment linkages which could lead to contagion due to trade complementarities. For instance, on the one hand, currency devaluation in an emerging economy is often accompanied by a sharp economic downturn (van Wijnbergen, 1986) , thereby compressing imports. This in turn reduces exports of its trading partners, consequently leading to "demand-driven" trade spillovers. On the other hand, there may be extensive and growing trade, investment and other intraregional interdependencies leading to contagion due to trade complementarities that are "supply-driven", i.e. "indirect channel". For instance, it is commonly noted that Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) has developed an intricate division of labor based on both horizontal and vertical differentiation in East Asia (Kawai and Urata, 1998 ). This in turn has stimulated intraregional trade which has constituted roughly two-fifths of the regions' total trade, with parts and components playing a particularly important role in such transactions (World Bank, 2000) .
In contrast to the complementary-induced channels, even economies that do not have strong trade and investment linkages with the crisis-hit economies may still be indirectly impacted if their exports to third markets overlap significantly. In other words, currency devaluation in one economy may provoke devaluation in a trade competitor (i.e. another economy with similar export structures/comparative advantage) that suddenly finds itself in a competitive disadvantage (Gerlach and Smets, 1995 , Huh and Kasa, 1997 and Corsetti, et al., 1999 .
The aim of this paper is to ascertain the importance of trade spillovers in spreading the regional downturn from the crisis-affected economies, viz. Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, and Korea (henceforth referred to as the Asia-5 economies), to Hong Kong and Singapore. The layout of the remainder of this paper is as follows.
Section 2 focuses on trade complementarities, examining Hong Kong's and Singapore's trade and investment linkages with the Asia-5 economies. Section 3 turns its attention to the competitiveness-driven trade spillover channel, investigating the degree of similarity of comparative advantage and export structures of the regional economies. The final section provides a summary by way of concluding.
Spillovers due to Trade Complementarity
Data Preliminaries
Since Hong Kong and Singapore are both engaged in a significant amount of entrêpot trade, a distinction needs to be made between "re-exports" and "domestic have fairly large trade surpluses with its trading partners, mainly due to inclusion of its re-exports, unlike trade data available via multilateral sources, which consider only exports with value-added (Sen, 2000) . Broadly similar problems arise with Hong Kong's trade data, given the large-scale transit trade with Mainland China (Feenstra, et al., 1998 into parts, components and accessories (PCAs) -production of which are parceled out or scattered across countries -not only feasible, but in most cases, the cost minimising strategy. This "slicing of the value-added chain" has multiplied the opportunities for international specialisation and exchange and the consequent gains from trade for countries involved by allowing them to extend the division of labor beyond final products to PCAs (Arndt, 1998 and Krugman, 1995) . Ng and Yeats (1999) Keeping the preceding important caveat in mind, we observe that the stock of Singapore's direct inward equity investment increased more than five-fold from US$ 14 billion in 1987 to US$ 76 billion in 1997. Among the major countries that invested in Singapore, the US, EU and Japan together accounted for nearly 56 percent of total inward direct investment in 1997 (Table 6a ). While direct investment from the Southeast Asian economies to Singapore did increase gradually over time, it constituted only about 6 percent of Singapore's total inward investment in 1997. Most of this investment was from Malaysia. It is useful to note that direct investment from Hong Kong was also negligible (3 percent). More revealing is Singapore's outward investment. Singapore has, since the 1990s, attempted to develop the external wing of its economy through strategic outward investments (Table 6b ). Thus total direct equity investment jumped threefold between 1992 and 1997 (US$ 28 billion). One third of the investment in 1997 was to Southeast Asia, mainly to Malaysia and Indonesia. Significantly, Hong Kong was also an important destination, accounting for 10 percent of Singapore's total outward investment in 1997.
Four countries, viz. Japan, UK, China and USA, accounted for almost four-fifths of Hong Kong's total inward investment in 1997 (which totaled about US $170 billion) (Table 7a ). The Asia-5 economies were not significant investors in Hong Kong, and neither was Singapore. Hong Kong's outward investments were overwhelmingly directed towards Mainland China (US$267 billion in 1997) ( Table 7b ). The only other significant investment destination was Indonesia (US$15.6 billion in 1997). Direct investment to Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Korea in aggregate constituted less that US$ 8 billion in investments in 1997. 
Spillover due to Trade Competition
It has become legion to think of trade, growth and development in East Asia in terms of Japan as the most advanced economy, producing and exporting new goods before others in the region. Japan in turn has been closely followed by the four economies, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, collectively referred to as the "Four Tigers" or "Gang of Four". Then come the other crisis-hit economies (Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia), and behind them, Mainland China 12 .
Accordingly, the devaluation of the currencies of the three Tiger economies in 1997-98 may have placed Hong Kong, which persisted with its US dollar-based currency board arrangement, at a competitive disadvantage. Empirical estimation of "equilibrium" exchange real exchange rates in Hong Kong and Singapore is instructive in this regard IMF, 2000) . While
Singapore's exchange rate had been maintained at a competitive level (i.e. at a level consistent with "underlying macroeconomic fundamentals") prior to and throughout the East Asian crisis, Hong Kong's exchange rate was overvalued pre-crisis, and the that of Hong Kong amounted to 12 and 55 percent, respectively (UNCTAD, 1999). 11 Dungey and Martin (2000) find that trade spillovers from Thailand accounted for 63 percent of the volatility of the Malaysian ringgit. 12 This pattern of comparative advantage across economies in the region has been referred to as the "flying geese formation" due to Japanese economist, Akamatsu (1962) . Feenstra and Rose (2000) provide a recent confirmation of this phenomenon.
degree of overvaluation deteriorated sharply during the crisis following the spate of regional currency devaluations 13 .
Revealed Comparative Advantage
In search of the significance of the competition-driven trade channel, we compare the comparative advantages of the two city states and the Asia-5 economies. While we would ideally like to examine relative factor endowments of each of the economies in question, data limitations necessitate focusing on ex-post comparative advantage. For this purpose, shifts in comparative advantage are identified using the export index of "Revealed Comparative Advantage" or RCA (Balassa and Noland, 1989 ). This index has been fairly widely used to explain the export performance and similarity of trade patterns among the East Asian economies (for instance, see Chow, 1990 and Rana, 1990 ).
We compute the RCAs for Singapore, Hong Kong and the Asia-5 economies, so as to enable a cross-country comparison of shifting comparative advantage. The indices are calculated for four years: 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1996 , a year before the crisis began with the devaluation of the Thai baht in July 1997 (Table 8) 14
. Our analysis focuses on the exports of selected product groups of manufacturing exports according to the relative factor intensities product classification used by Garnaut and Anderson (1980) . In particular, we classify product groups of trade into four main categories: unskilled labour intensive goods, physical capital intensive goods, human capital intensive goods and technology intensive goods ( Table 9 ). The data source used is the UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook.
Between 1982 and 1996, while Hong Kong's level of specialisation in unskilled labour intensive goods (as proxied by the RCA index) fell from 7.1 in 1982 to 3.5 in 1996, it was unable to shift its specialisation towards technology intensive goods, the RCA falling from 1.5 in 1982 to 1.2 in 1996. In contrast, Singapore was successful in increasing its specialisation significantly in technology intensive goods (its RCA in this product group rising from 1.5 in 1982 to 2.7 in 1996), while decisively moving 13 However this does not necessarily follow that Hong Kong would be well advised to forsake its currency board regime in favour of a more flexible regime. First, the orchestration of an exit from a fixed exchange rate regime to a flexible one is a difficult maneuver that could be destabilising (Eichengreen, 1999 and Eichengreen et al., 1999 (Ng and Yeats, 1999) 15 .
Export Similarity
While the RCA index using export statistics is useful as a first test of trade complementarity, it is a proxy measure of specialisation in production and not necessarily exports. As Ng and Yeats (1999, p.21) have noted, the RCA index "must be used with some caution since domestic measures that have nothing to do with comparative advantage (like local subsidies) or foreign trade barriers, can impart a bias in the index." It fails to capture direct product competition between regional economies with similar export structures. . Lastly, the correlation between Hong Kong's and Singapore's export structures was relatively low (0.37), consistent with the previous findings using the RCA indices.
Concluding Observations
The literature on the East Asian crisis has concentrated almost exclusively on the five crisis-hit economies. Scant attention has been paid to Hong Kong and Singapore, both of which also suffered from contagious fallout from the crisis, despite being well acknowledged as having relatively sound financial and economic fundamentals. This paper has examined the extent to which trade spillovers have been important in transmitting regional contagion to Hong Kong and Singapore. 18 Petroleum products refined (SITC 334) are another important category of exports to all these countries.
19 While a more complete picture can only be obtained by a comparison of export structures to major third markets, data limitations preclude such an analysis from being undertaken.
structures to four of the five crisis-hit economies, especially in parts and components, may also have been an important factor in spreading the crisis to
Singapore. The case of Hong Kong is much more curious. It had very low trade and investment interdependencies with the Asia-5 economies, and while there is some evidence of export similarity with the crisis economies, this was far less than that of Singapore's. This conclusion is consistent with the findings of Abeysinghe (1999) .
Using a structural VAR model that transforms a trade matrix (capturing both direct and indirect trade linkages) to output multipliers (impulse responses for three years after the shock), he finds that the transmission effect from the regional economies to Hong Kong is "very small". In contrast, regional transmission of shocks to Singapore due to trade is "relatively high" over time (Table 13 ). All of this leads to the conclusion that one needs to look elsewhere --spillovers due to non-trade related reasons, "pure contagion" or common shocks --for a rationalisation of the transmission of the East Asian crisis to Hong Kong.
Appendix 1: Trade Intensity Index
The bilateral trade intensity index for total trade may be stated as follows:
where T ij = total trade intensity index of country i with country j; X ij = exports of country i to j ; M ij = imports of country i from j; X i = total exports of country i; M i = total imports of country i; X wj = total world exports to country j ; M wj = total world imports from country j; X w = total world exports; and M w = total world imports. The numerator in eq. (1) The RCA index represents the ratio of the share of country i in world exports of commodity k to its share of total commodity exports:
X w k / X w where: X i k = exports by country i of commodity k; X w k = world exports of commodity k; X i = total exports of country i; and X w = total world exports. The weighted average of RCAs of all commodities adds up to unity. The RCA ranges between zero and unity in case a country is not specialised in exports of that category and from one to infinity if it is specialised 20 .
20 Hence the RCA index is not symmetric. Since the range of RCA values lead to a skewed distribution, it violates the assumption of normality of errors in case of a regression model estimated using these values (Laursen, 1998 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Year
Indonesia
Malaysia Thailand Philippines Korea 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Year
Malaysia
Thailand Philippines Korea Fiscal balance 1618 n.a n.a n.a n.a Current a/c balance (US $ mn.) n.a n.a n.a 2901 9281
Comparison of Export Grow th Rate of Hong Kong w ith Asia-5 Economies
Investment ratio a 29.6 32.1 n.a n.a n.a Savings rate 33.7 31.1 n.a n.a n.a External debt to exports n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a External debt to exports n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a Note: Transmission multipliers show the impact on the country concerned of a -1% shock in each of the other 6 combined Source: Abeysinghe (1999) 
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